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Quantitative Analysis of Historical Material as the Basis 
for a New Cooperation Between History and Sociology 
(1980)∗ 
Erwin K. Scheuch 
I. Programmatic Cooperation Versus Quantitative Analysis 
There is no shortage of programmatic statements on systematic cooperation be-
tween historians and sociologists, but actual joint work has rather been impeded by 
just such programs. This is not a unique experience, as programs for interdiscipli-
nary work between other disciplines often fared no better1. Interdisciplinarity as a 
sustained activity requires certain conditions quite different from those emphasized 
in many of the programmatic statements. It is the contention of this paper that these 
conditions now exist for the quantitative analysis of historical materials. 
So far, the most important contributions to sociology were the work of scholars 
who as individuals were able to synthesize knowledge from sociology and history. 
Among the several scholars from the founding period of sociology — such as Lo-
renz v. Stein, Robert v. Mohl, Gustav Schmoller, Werner Sombart, Joseph Schum-
peter —, Max Weber stands out as a scholar with a universal knowledge by the 
standards of his time who translated historical material into a basis for a systematic 
sociology2. Contrary to Weber’s reception in the USA and from there subsequently 
in other countries, his colleagues in Germany saw in him more of a social historian 
than of a sociologist; von Wiese’s reference to Max Weber in his short “History of 
Sociology” as a promising empiricist and economic historian is representative3. As 
the knowledge of historical detail accumulates such a synthesis as an individual ac-
complishment becomes an obvious impossibility — safe for a selectivity and level 
of abstraction from details that earn such attempts the epiteton “tour de force”. In 
such uses of universal history as by Herbert Spencer, or Oswald Spengler, or 
Pitirim Sorokin historical material is not really the object of an analysis but illustra-
                                                             
∗  Reprint from: HSF Vol. 6 (1980), pp. 25-50. 
1  Examples are the attempts to institutionalize interdisciplinarity between sociology and 
medicine, jurisprudence and economics. Cf. Scheuch, Erwin K., Interdisziplinäre Zusam-
menarbeit — aus der Sicht des Soziologen, in: Langenbeck’s Archiv der Chirurgie, No. 
337, München 1974. 
2  Max Weber as re-imported from the United States and interpreted by Talcott Parsons is 
primarily the author of part of his incompleted “Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft”. Prior to this 
“Parsonification” the work considered central was his sociological analysis of world relig-
ions, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 3 vols., Tübingen 1920-1921. 
3  Cf. von Wiese, Leopold, Soziologie, Geschichte und Hauptprobleme, 5th edit., Berlin 1954, 
p. 129 and elsewhere. As is true for many of his contemporaries, von Wiese treated the cul-
tural philosopher Alfred Weber as the more prominent of the brothers. 
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tion for a systematic point, characteristically some form of either evolutionary or 
cyclical perspective of human existence4. 
Actually this was the prevailing use made of history even earlier by some of the 
founding fathers of sociology, such Georges Sorel, or Gaetano Mosca, or Vilfredo 
Pareto — and certainly also Karl Marx, excepting his “18th of Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon”5. This use of historical material as illustration in the guise of “proof” 
contributed to the hostility of historians against sociology, which in the tradition of 
German historicism was expressed by such influential historians as Johann Gustav 
Droysen or Heinrich v. Treitschke6. In retrospect, it is specifically the use of his-
torical material from a single systematic viewpoint — be it the eternal circulation of 
elites, or the oscillation between materialistic and indealistic orientation of cultures, 
or the trend from simple to ever increasing complexity, or history as a succession of 
class struggles — that makes out of “great books” very perishable products. As 
knowledge of historical detail increases these great books suffer the fate that has 
been characterized for the natural sciences as the greatest tragedy in the life of a 
scholar: A beautiful idea slain by a brute fact. Courses on the history of sociology 
have as their main subject matter such systematic uses of historical material by uni-
versalistically educated scholars that are now merely of historical interest; and not 
as contributions of substantive knowledge7. 
This tendency to premature high level generalization by many of the founding 
fathers of sociology aside — although it is still with us and rewarded with reputa-
tion —, the synthesis as an individual accomplishment is obviously only fruitful in 
the early development of a discipline. This has been no different in the cooperation 
between other disciplines that are rich in material and conceptual apparatus. There 
is no way around the need for cooperation between scholars from different disci-
plines who contribute to this cooperation through their distinct competence, such as 
the specific competence of the historian in judging documents or being able to place 
them into context, or the skill of sociologists in data analysis. It is more problematic 
to which degree and especially in which way sociologists and historians can com-
                                                             
4  The most important evolutionary writer for sociology has been Spencer, Herbert, The Prin-
ciples of Sociology, 3 vols., New York 1876-1896. A very characteristic recent example of 
cyclical theories is Sorokin’s attempt to interpret history as an oscillation between material-
istic and spiritual orientation; Sorokin, Pitirim A., Society, Culture, and Personality, New 
York 1947, especially Part VI. 
5  The evolutionary orientation in nearly all of Marx’s works is obvious, although it is not 
always recognized to which degree Marx chose his references to actual facts and events to 
fit his evolutionary scheme. In some of his comments on events of his own time, however, 
Marx is a historiographer — specifically in his analyses of the various uprisings in France. 
6  In reaction to this the school of historicism in Germany emphasized the need to understand 
each time by itself as a unique configuration. This historical approach had for a consider-
able time the function of an alternative social science to sociology. Compare Droysen, Jo-
hann Gustav, Grundriß der Historik, Leipzig 1868 and von Treitschke, Heinrich, Die Ge-
sellschaftswissenschaft. Ein kritischer Versuch, Leipzig 1859. 
7  An example of this are theories on the development of the family from a presumed “natu-
ral” condition to its current form. Cases were cited to argue for the primacy of just one form 
of the family, such as the primacy of group marriage by Friedrich Engels (“Vom Ursprung 
der Familie.”), or of the matriarchal family by Johann Jakob Bachofen, or of the patriarchal 
family as argued by Edward Westermarck. As systematic information about the past and of 
development these “great books” are useless. 
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bine their respective problem formulations and conceptual apparatus — a point to 
which it will be necessary to return. 
In view of this, the various programmatic statements for cooperation betweeen 
the two disciplines are understandable — and yet they have resulted in more dam-
age than good if they were phrased as exclusive programs rather than as one new 
possibility in addition to other programs (or paradigms, as it now has become fash-
ionable to say). Examples of such exclusive programs are the demand to rewrite 
history as social history (at least for purposes of instruction in secondary schools), 
or the blanket demand for history to be practiced as an applied social science8. Add 
to this such ideological formulations as the request that history should from now on 
spotlight the downtrodden, the victims of events rather than the actors, and the call 
for cooperation between historians and sociologists becomes a political issue9. 
However, historians may be reminded that this politication of disciplinary issues is 
not a consequence of “sociologisation” but due to a more general trend that pro-
duced also such sects as “revisionistic” history10. There is supreme irony in this rei-
deologization of history and sociology alike, as it is largely based on a defunct his-
toriography. 
The currently virulent ideologies apart, programmatic requests for cooperation 
of the type quoted above tend to block sustained work for reasons of principle. In 
all these cases a follow-up of the programmatic request assumes that from now on a 
particular perspective, a paradigm, is shared, up to and often including a common 
teleology. In this day and age this may be the binding element for a sect but cannot 
                                                             
8  Compare Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (ed.), Geschichte und Soziologie, Köln 1972; Tilly, Charles, 
Clio and Minerva, in: McKinney, J. C., and Tiryakian, E. A. (eds.), Theoretical Sociology, 
New York 1970, pp. 434-466; Hobsbawm, E. J., From Social History to the History of So-
ciety, in: Daedalus, No. 100 (1971); Benson, L., Toward the Scientific Study of History, 
New York 1972. For problems resulting from such an approach see Sherif, Mustapher and 
Sherif, Caroline (eds.), Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences, Chicago 
1969. For a more pragmatic approach see the program of the International Association for 
Historical Social Research, QUANTUM (1975). 
9  A very pointed advocate for a new history whose heroes would be the silent masses, a his-
tory that would view events from the bottom up instead of replicating the view of the “mak-
ers” of history, is Modell, John, Die ,Neue Sozialgeschichte in Amerika, in: Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft, Voll (1975), pp. 155 passim. One of the most influential sociologists-plus-
historians, Richard Tilly, is not free of the claim that this new history is at last real history. 
Cf. Tilly, Richard, and Hohorst, Gerd, Sozialer Protest in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert, 
in: Jarausch, Konrad (ed.), Quantifizierung in der Geschichtswissenschaft, Düsseldorf 1976, 
pp. 232-278; also Tilly, Richard, Zum Thema, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 3 (1977), 
pp. 151-152. The ideological use of history has invaded the class rooms of secondary edu-
cation and journalism. Cf. Rudolph, Hermann, Was ist Geschichte?, in: Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, June 9, 1978, p. 25. 
10  A central figure for the evolution of an ideologically committed history is Moore, Barring-
ton, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston 1966. Compare also Rothman, 
Stanley, Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution, in: American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 61-82, and Fogel, R. W., and Engerman, S. L. (eds.), The Rein-
terpretation of American Economic History, New York 1971. French ,structuralism` is an-
other intellectual fashion that encouraged an ideologically committed history; compare 
Schiwy, Günter (ed.), Der französische Strukturalismus, Reinbek 1969. A German variant 
of this plea for ideological commitment is Schmidt, Alfred, Geschichte und Struktur, 
München 1971. 
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be the universal orientation for an empirical discipline that every so often happens 
upon new knowledge. 
The quantitative analysis of historical material may sometimes be advocated in a 
manner that sounds like the programs referred to earlier, and yet it is a completely 
different basis for cooperation. All that is required here is an agreement on a com-
mon material, and a common technology in data handling. From traditional points 
of view in the discipline this may presuppose both substantive and methodological 
decisions that are considered alien. One may object that trivial objects of trivial 
people are not the observational base for a history that reveals purposes to mankind 
or is able to provide lessons to the present. As a sociologist, these arguments are 
outside my proper realm of interest. The methodological argument that this quanti-
tative history presupposes a deterministic view, however, is not; this was the central 
issue in one of the great methodological controversies in sociology, namely the his-
toricism controversy. As is usual for such sweeping issues it did not get resolved 
but was largely forgotten — and rightly so. In order to perform quantitative analysis 
a deterministic view is unnecessary; it is only necessary to expect that there are also 
regularities in human existence which are not apparent to the actors themselves but 
have to be inferred. Whether this is indeed so and what strength these factors have 
relative to unique influences, is an empirical question. The experience so far sug-
gests that it is worthwhile to continue this search, and be it only as a form of de-
scription that transcends any observers ability. And if some sociologists argue that 
with industrialization man’s conditions are changed in a way that reference to pre-
vious experience is an obstacle to what is really needed, namely utopian phantasy, 
then again this is properly an empirical issue and not a decision immune to it. Any-
way, so far the predictions of the non-utopians have been better than utopian sce-
narios of the immediate future. 
Quantitative analysis of historical material provides a common empirical base 
for many diverse interpretations — in this way similar to such a tool as time and 
money budgets11. Its particular contribution is the description of diversity and the 
detection of regularities in so far as both transcend the observational powers of con-
temporaries — and this is a direct analogy to the most fruitful applications of quan-
titavive techniques in sociology. This empirical base is open to a variety of para-
digms — and emphasizing this may help to overcome some of the reservations of 
historians that as yet view this trend with reservations. 
For sociologists a different explanation is necessary to stimulate their attention. 
There are, however, two traditions that impede the full use of a new, vast empirical 
base for their discipline. 
                                                             
11  This was the perspective from which Lenin advocated the collection of time and money 
budgets, namely as reflections of reality. This led to a specific version of empirical research 
in countries that officially follow Leninist principles. The most representative presentation 
of this research is Szalai, Alexander (ed.), The Use of Time, The Hague 1972. 
 67
II. On the Evolutionary Tradition in Sociology 
The topic should be unnecessary as we have it on the eminent authority of Talcott 
Parsons that “Herbert Spencer is dead!”12. However, Herbert Spencer under differ-
ent names is very much alive, indeed, and kicking for the same reasons that pro-
duced Herbert Spencers in the first place. For a while it seemed that Herbert 
Spencer was dead, as the motivations for the evolutionary canvasses in our disci-
plines had paled. Now, the interest in the course of development is high once again 
as the confidence in the acceptability of the future is low. 
Sociology — in the form that has become professionalized — is indeed a “crisis 
discipline”. In the 19th century there was a wide-spread agreement that the current 
situation, the current societal condition, could not last. This was not to be a new 
form of human existence to continue but a transitory period13. Conservative observ-
ers, such as Wilhelm Heinrich v. Riehl or Lorenz v. Stein, might emphasize the fea-
tures of dissolution that they saw at their time, and would accordingly choose topics 
and perspective in empirical work. From a more radical perspective one might em-
phasize the direction of development and opt for a teleology which is obvious in the 
works of Marx, Spencer, Comte, but also characteristic in such concepts as Ferdi-
nand Tönnies’ “Gemeinschaft” and “Gesellschaft”14. 
For sociology, the empirical basis for the construction of these teleological 
schemes, answering “whither are we going?”, shifted over time with material from 
other disciplines being dominant then. We are now used to sociologists being their 
own data gatherers but during this ,heroic` period they relied on historical material, 
sometimes ethnographic material. There was a preference for historical material 
until about the 1870s, and as subsequently ambitious ethnographic reports became 
available this was the preferred material. The differences between Marx and the 
elder Friedrich Engels are a case in point15. To a degree both types of material were 
                                                             
12  Cf. Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action, New York 1937. Later, Parsons is less 
certain, as is evident in the Point of View of the Author, in: Block, Max (ed.), The Social 
Theories of Talcott Parsons, Englewood Cliffs 1961, pp. 311-363. 
13  That in spite of all the protestations about his “scientism” in charting the course of history, 
Karl Marx is really driven by apocalyptic vison was recognized early by Sorel, George, La 
décomposition du marxisme, Paris 1907. René König revived this understanding in 
Soziologie heute, Zürich 1949, pp. 30 passim, and he stimulated the work of Jakob Taubes, 
Abendländische Eschatologie, Bern 1947. 
14  The apparent dichotomies prevalent in sociology early in this century, were frequently 
teleological in an extremely reduced form. This is true for Emile Durkheim’s juxtaposition 
of mechanical vs. organic solidarity, for Ferdinand Tönnies’ dichotomy “Gemeinschaft” vs. 
“Gesellschaft”, and for Charles Cooley’s distinction primary vs. secondary groups. The 
very basic concepts of sociology until the recent past implied teleologies. 
15  Friedrich Engels was the consumer of ethnographic material, as he was attentive to empiri-
cal material that came into his view. However, there are significant blind spots, the most 
important being an ignorance of the quantitative history already available at that time, such 
as Graunt, John, Natural and Political Observations Mentioned in a Following Index and 
Made Upon the Bills of Mortality, London 1662. Neither did they pay attention to quantita-
tive research at their time, such as Le Play, M. F., La reforme sociale en France, Paris 1864, 
and Morselli, Henry, Suicide — An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics, New York 
 68
used in the same way: one would look at the past or at “primitive” cultures as a de-
scription of origins. Hopefully, one would find a few examples of intervening con-
ditions, and from there constructed a picture of the future. 
A specific interest was the search for zero-points of human developments, those 
elementary forms behind which human existence did not go back, the bases from 
where human existence progressed. And if one had found the zero-base, one could 
then speculate to which degree human history was in error, impeded possibilities; 
not only would one be able to predict the future but to create a better one by know-
ing from history not only the direction but also man’s unused potential. Seen from 
today it may be baffling to read the arguments about the originality either of the 
nuclear family or of group-marriages, the arguments resting on exceedingly few 
cases. However, this was primarily not a discussion with scholarly intentions, sine 
ira et studio, but one which had immediate ideological consequences. The writer to 
whom we are obliged for the very term “sociology”, Auguste Comte, consequently 
proceeded from an apparent concern with scholarship to the founding of an elitist 
sect. 
Of course, the empirical base available to social scientists of this time was ex-
tremely thin. Each time when a significant new contribution of ethnographers be-
came available the evolutionary constructs needed to be rearranged. Equally, a sin-
gle case, the presumed conditions in an individual tribe, had a sensational impact 
provided the case fitted the preconceptions of the social scientist. An example is the 
publication by Henry Morgan about the Iroquois. Morgan was employed as an en-
gineer in building a railroad to Lake Erie, and he became fascinated by the life of 
Indians as he was able to record it at the end of the 19th century; there are now 
some arguments that this was a non-typical situation fot the tribe itself. Even though 
this was a contribution by an amateur, it was immediately used by the evolutionists 
such as Friedrich Engels, and even today the presumed case of the Iroquois as proof 
of the primacy of matriarchalism was cited uncritically by ideologists such as 
Ernest Bornemann. 
The empirical material was in truth not an empirical base for the theory but mere 
illustration for preconceptions. Thus, when the cultural revolution of the sixties 
erupted with the dusting off of 19th century thought, the example of the earlier use 
of the Iroquois had a contemporary parallel. Some deservedly forgotten student-
sociologist thought he had found an African tribe, the Amba, who lacked any strati-
fication in power or authority. And significantly, a fully grown German university 
professor, Ralf Dahrendorf, argued the case as though it would be decisive for the 
question whether stratification in power is a necessary part of a developed social 
structure16. Contrary to the situation at the time of Henry Morgan and his report on 
the Iroquois, there was now ample ethnological material on the stratification in 
                                                                                                                                
1882 (Durkheim’s “Suicide” was not published until 1897!). In addition there were many 
more good statistical sources available than were used — as is evident from Weiss, Hilda 
P., Les enquêtes ouvrières en France entre 1830 et 1848, Paris 1936. The social sciences — 
or at least the part that was handed-on to the past as important — could have been far more 
empirical than they actually were. 
16  Cf. Dahrendorf, Ralf, Amba, Amerikaner und Kommunisten — zur These der ‘Universali-
tät von Herrschaft’, in: Dahrendorf, R. (ed.), Pfade aus Utopia, München 1967, pp. 315-
336. 
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power of tribal societies, but the neo-evolutionists were not interested in this, even 
if the Amba had indeed lacked any stratification in power and authority: So what? 
The use of historical material by evolutionaries and neo-evolutionaries was of 
the same character. This was not really an interest in history as a characterization in 
each case of past conditions as they really were, and there was accordingly no im-
mersion in sources. The characteristic evolutionist was and is in search of building 
blocks to fit his architectural design of human development. Contrasting the use of 
ethnographic and historical material by Johann Jakob Bachofen and Edward 
Westermarck with the work of Karl Wittfogel or Max Weber exemplifies the differ-
ence between using other disciplines for illustration rather than as providing an ex-
tension of the empirical base for sociology. 
When Backofen and Westermarck argued for one “original” form of the family, 
then “original” was to imply “natural”. Human history was then a formation of this 
natural state as a deformation, until it would be possible now to regain the natural 
state at a higher level of civilization. The mystical theologian Bachofen cited his-
torical and ethnographic material, but also used legends and fairy tales, to demon-
strate the primacy of matriarchalism; the historically known forms of the family, 
such as the classical Roman family (or rather what at that time was believed to have 
been the Roman family) or the family of Judaism were seen as suppression of a 
natural state17. Parallels were maintained between the presumed suppression of 
women in patriarchalism and the political organisation of countries. Westermarck 
too attributed a paradigmatic quality to the forms of the familial distribution of au-
thority, although he cited historical sources for the primacy of the patriarchal fam-
ily. Even though this controversy surfaced again as part of the intellectual imita-
tions that were characteristic for the “cultural revolution”, family sociologists 
generally agree that searching ethnographic and historical records for a “natural” 
state of human existence is futile. Evidente from research on primates makes it 
more likely that there was “originally” more than one form of the family. It is char-
acteristic for sociological evolutionism that it is clandestinely anti-historical, 
                                                             
17  Our understanding of the Roman family is largely a reflection of the construction of ideal 
types by legal historians. Even if we leave aside the question whether these legal constructs 
had much to do with reality — and among other indications sculptures and inscriptions on 
cemeteries suggest otherwise there were two legal forms for marriage among which the 
spouses could choose. The patriarchal family was the marriage “cum manu”, the essence of 
which was the transfer of the wife from her kin to that of her husband’s, as against the mar-
riage sine manu which was a contract between individuals including the right to divorce for 
both parties. This latter form was usual and disapproved by the Caesars — which may be 
the reason for historians to be largely silent about it. Even the family of Ancient Judaism 
was probably not an institution of despotic power as it appeared in official descriptions and 
in several spectacular cases in the Old Testament. At the Institute of Applied Social Re-
search of the University of Cologne we reanalyzed the conflicts within the family that are 
described in the Old Testament. These descriptions were read as an indication of what they 
implied about the operative norms in daily life. As a result we concluded that the usual pic-
ture of patriarchalism in Ancient Judaism referred primarily to the family as a religious 
unit, and in official transactions with the outside world — but not in other fields of behav-
ior. Cf. Wurmnest, Karl Friedrich, Die Rolle des Individuums innerhalb von Familie und 
Ehe im Alten Testament anhand relevanter Texte unter Berücksichtigung welt- und kultur-
geschichtlich bedingter Raum-Zeitstrukturen, unpublished dissertation at the Philosophi-
sche Fakultät, University of Cologne, 1978. 
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namely the search for non-historical conditions and the perspective of history as 
deformation. 
In analyzing historical material on the great river-valley civilizations, Karl 
Wittfogel also had an ideological motivation, namely to develop a scheme for the 
necessary development of state socialism into a bureaucratic oligarchy18. The cen-
trality of the single source of wealth, the river water, and the need for regulation of 
this resource, leads to the development of a central bureaucracy — and according to 
Wittfogel it does so with inevitability. Wittfogel’s writings resemble classical evo-
lutionism in his use of history in so far that historical instances of what Wittfogel 
calls “hydraulic civilizations” are presented with the intent to demonstrate an inevi-
table development, in this case the dominante of a bureaucratic class. However, 
Wittfogel does attempt to work as an historian, and above all history is treated as a 
normal state of human existence instead of a transitory condition. 
We mentioned already that to his German contemporaries, Max Weber was 
rather an economic historian than the theorist of the first part of Economy and Soci-
ety19. At the beginning of his career, German economic historians were analyzing 
their material in order to show necessary “stages” in the development of civiliza-
tions, and to demonstrate a close relationship between an economic and a social 
order. This was a far cry from the evolutionism of Auguste Comte or Herbert 
Spencer who maintained a continuity of evolution from simple inanimated condi-
tions to the complexity of society, an evolution that presumably was inevitable, 
monodirectional and monocausal. Yet Weber differed from those contemporary 
economic historians still further into the direction of an historian strictu sensu. In 
the central part of his work, the volumes on the sociology of religion, Weber delib-
erately varies civilizations in order to refute monocausal notions about the relation 
between “base” (economy) and “superstructure” (religion): Each of these civiliza-
tions has to be understood via its own “Sinn” (approximately “meaning”), has a 
“Gestalt” (approximately “shape”) of its own20. Yet Weber was also a sociologist 
using concepts without specific time-space meanings, and in this context he was a 
modified evolutionist. Weber’s writings on music, on authority (an unfortunate 
                                                             
18  Cf. Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism, New York 1957. Wittfogel presents his mono-
graph as comparative research with total societies as a unit. 
19  In the American reception of Max Weber the conditions under which Weber approached his 
monumental Economy and Society are largely forgotten. It is no longer possible to recon-
struct a definitive version of this posthumous work, as it is likely that Weber changed his 
original notions several time as the work progressed. Economy and Society was to be in a 
way a contrast to his work so far as it was to present his concepts in a systematic way. This 
proved to be more difficult than expected as indeed the concepts were developed at differ-
ent times in response to different tasks. Thus, it is simply not possible to establish a system-
atic relation between the taxonomies for forms of legitimate authority (“reine Typen der 
Herrschaft”) and the taxonomy for types of action orientation (“Typen des Handelns”), 
without creating confusion — as is indeed sometimes the case in Economy and Society. Cf. 
Scheuch, Erwin K., and Kutsch, Thomas, Grundbegriffe der Soziologie, 2nd edit., Stuttgart 
1975, Chapter 9, Sections 1 and 2. For a new way to look at Economy and Society see Ten-
bruck, Friedrich H., Abschied von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, in: Staatswissenschaft, Tü-
bingen 1978, pp. 1-34. 
20  The notion of “Sinn” is central for Weber’s analysis of a total system: it’s the attribution of 
‘Leitmotivs’ to the actions in a society. Cf. Girndt, Helmut, Das soziale Handeln als Grund-
kategorie erfahrungswissenschaftlicher Soziologie, Tübingen 1967. 
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translation of his “Herrschaft”), on science, and on bureaucracy all have one “Leit-
motiv”: Why did a specific type of rationality develop only in Europe?21 In pursu-
ing these two main lines of work — their relation cannot be discussed here — We-
ber did not work with the conclusions of historians but with the source material 
itself. 
Even the second accent of Weber’s work could not be replicated today. There 
may be a revival of evolutionism in intellectual life, but only in the sense of a phi-
losophical exploitation of historical generalizations and not in the sense of a use of 
historical sources to construct laws of development. None of the grand conclusions 
of the evolutionists stood the test of time, and it is unlikely that the neo-
evolutionists will fare better. There is now such a wealth of empirical evidente, and 
the movement of quantitative history increases the volume still further, that a sim-
ple ordering whether in “stages of development” or in cycles is no longer feasible. 
The publications of Shmuel Eisenstadt demonstrate that historiography and social 
science can still be combined in the grand style, but the accent is on comparativism 
and definitely not on evolution22. A sociology that hopes to regain the courage to 
sweeping theories of the 19th century, a sociology that looks upon history as an op-
portunity to revive evolutionism, misses the specific usefulness of the current meet-
ing of sociology and history. The description of everyday life and mass events in 
the past that now becomes possible, definitely does not lend itself to a type of theo-
retizing in the evolutionary tradition. Although at first sight the assertion may seem 
paradoxical, it nevertheless can be argued that structural-functional theoretizing is 
more compatible with the data from quantitative history. 
III. Is Functionalism Necessary Anti-Historical? 
This is only in part a rhetorical question, as there is no unequivocal answer: there is 
no necessary conflict between a structural-functional kind of theoretizing and his-
tory, but in practice this is so. This is probably due to the development of structural-
functionalism in the United States. Be that as it may, structural-functionalism has 
been so dominant a mode of theoretizing since the middle forties until the middle 
sixties that it became synonimous with general sociological theory. In practice, this 
kind of theory prided itself in formulating general sentences without time-space ref-
erents, was general theory in line with the introductory part of Weber’s Economy 
and Society and not with his other writing. lt was usual amongst sociologists to un-
                                                             
21  The notion of “rationality” as a ‘Leitmotiv’ of systems is explored in Münch, Richard, Max 
Webers ‘Anatomie des okzidentalen Rationalismus’ — eine systemtheoretische Lektüre, in: 
Soziale Welt, 29 (1978), pp. 217-246. There are two more sides to Weber’s work, the sec-
ond of which is largely unknown today. It is better known that Weber was interested in 
methodological issues, as is evident e. g. in Weber, Max, Methodologische Schriften, 
Frankfurt 1968 (a collection), but he was also a passionate commentator on political devel-
opments. Cf. Weber, Max, Gesammelte politische Schriften, 2nd edit., Tübingen 1958. 
22  A good introduction to his approach is Eisenstadt, S. N. (ed.), The Decline of Empires, 
Englewood Cliffs 1967. Much more ambitious is Eisenstadt, S. N. (ed.), Political Sociol-
ogy, New York 1971, which in spite of its title is predominantly a book with historical 
comparisons, albeit of a non-quantitative character. 
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derstand this mode of formulating as following the example of the successful natu-
ral sciences — and that meant largely physics. 
This is, however, a misunderstanding. The discipline in the natural sciences 
closest to structural-functionalism in sociology is, at least in the case of Parsons, 
rather biology. Biology, that is a discipline which has to do with reactive systems, 
and in this sense it is contrary to some of the classical sciences. Here, the object is 
not “cause” and “effect” but “effect and counter-effect”. At any given time, an ob-
ject or process may serve more than one function, or the same object or process 
may serve different functions at different times. A biological organism as an object 
of explanation is a vastly more complicated thing then the inanimate nature. Society 
as well, if structural-functionalism is properly practiced, is treated as a reactive sys-
tem and not in an analogy to inanimate nature. 
This would be complicated enough, but in addition there is an unnecessary prob-
lem in the functionalism as it is actually practiced. It becomes most apparent in 
what is called “Systems Analysis”. In this approach it is assumed or implied that 
basically all parts of a system are necessarily cooperating and that they react tightly 
together. This is completely unnecessary to assume since there are parts in the body 
too, which are unnecessary, not everything is directed to the same purpose. There 
are countervailing processes, functional substitutes in addition to fixed organs, and 
a lot of give-and-take, i. e. looseness between organs and parts of a body. However, 
systems theory as a specific form of structural functionalism in its actual practice 
assumed a direct reaction of all parts of a system to each other23. 
The conceptual apparatus, the research problems and the empirical research con-
nected with these approaches found its purest expression in small-group research24. 
Indeed, small-group research has as an object something that does not really exist 
but is constituted as an construct — and yet this research was to a degree successful 
in finding universals that eluded sociologists in many other areas. Yes, sociology 
has developed universal sentences about human behavior that can be applied in a 
variety of contexts. This copy of physics was not a story of complete failure, unfor-
tunately it is also not a story of a large scale success. As sociologists moved beyond 
the micro level it became much harder to justify time-space free sentences in terms 
of “X” being a function of “Y”. What stood sociologists in good stead, namely the 
type of conceptual apparatus, the type of methodology and specifically the type of 
interpretation when they worked with the immediately observable, was much less 
successful when they had to work with indicators and the proof had to be inferen-
                                                             
23  The most prominent representative of this kind of systems theory in Germany is today Nik-
las Luhmann; cf. Luhmann, Niklas (ed.), Soziologische Aufklärung — Aufsätze zur Theo-
rie sozialer Systeme, Opladen 1970; also Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 
1968; also Zur systemtheoretischen Konstruktion von Evolution, in: Lepsius, Rainer (ed.), 
Zwischenbilanz der Soziologie, Stuttgart 1976, pp. 37-48; also Generalized Media and the 
Problem of Contingency, in: Loubser, Jan J., et al. (eds.), Explorations in General Theory in 
the Social Sciences, New York 1974. 
24  A recent overview of the whole field is Schneider, H. D., Kleingruppenforschung, Stuttgart 
1975. For the self understanding of this approach see Bales, Robert Fred, Personality and 
Interpersonal Behavior, New York 1970. The artificial character of the whole field is cri-
tized by Sorokin, Pitirim A., Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences, 
Chicago 1956. 
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tial. Most macro phenomena are of an inferential nature. This became even more 
important and more obvious when cross-cultural research became important. 
As structural-functionalism has been a part-success, as there are areas which can 
be shown as models to other disciplines, as the methodology works very fine, this 
partial success tends to somewhat impede the openness in turning to such a vast 
new area of material as becomes available to us in quantitative history. Especially, 
the part-success tends to inhibit a re-examination whether structural-functionalism 
needs to be practiced in the way that prevailed up to now. 
IV. Empirical Sociology Experiences Limits 
At the end of a period of more than thirty years of development in empirical sociol-
ogy, there is now some soul searching and attempts at stock taking25. This was in 
many ways a most successful period: in some fields general “laws” akin to those of 
physics were identified; the methodology for the social sciences in general was fur-
thered and became an export article even to those who voiced programmatic reser-
vations against “positivistic” sociology; and a vast amount of descriptive knowl-
edge was accumulated. Methodology and social description could be so 
standardized that they could be the base for a service industry that now produces 
vast quantities of facts. Increasingly, social scientists begin to tap the additional vast 
data resources that come into being as a side-product of public and private bureauc-
racies26. Now that we are relatively data rich, we begin to feel just as those rich in 
                                                             
25  Examples of this self doubt, coupled with the desire to retain the claim to be at the same 
time a science and a tool of the Enlightment are Birnbaum, Norman, The Crisis of Indus-
trial Society, London 1969; Gouldner, Alvin W., The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, 
New York 1970; Dahrendorf, Ralf, Die Soziologie und der Soziologe, in: Hess, Gerhard 
(ed.), Konstanzer Universitätsreden, no year. It is instructive to compare these diagnoses 
with the actual work presented at the 17th German “Soziologentag” in 1974, presumably a 
crisis year if judged by public appearences: During the sociological convention routinized 
science (in the sense of Th. Kuhn) prevailed. See Lepsius, Zwischenbilanz. See also 
Scheuch, Erwin K., Die wechselnde Datenbasis der Soziologie. Zur Interaktion zwischen 
Theorie und Empirie, in: Müller, Paul J. (ed.), Die Analyse prozeß-produzierter Daten, 
Stuttgart 1977, pp. 5-41. 
26  An over-all view of this vast area is Wilcox, Lesly et al. (eds.), Social Indicators and Socie-
tal Monitoring, Amsterdam 1972. So far social scientists use only fractions of the material 
existing, as can be inferred from Statistisches Bundesamt, Das Arbeitsgebiet der Bundessta-
tistik 1976, Stuttgart 1976. Currently, the chief interest in using these process-produced or 
officially collected data is their appropriateness for societal monitoring, as explained in 
Zapf, Wolfgang (ed.), Sozialberichterstattung — Möglichkeiten und Probleme, Göttingen 
1976. See also Krupp, Hans-Jürgen, and Zapf, Wolfgang, Sozialpolitik und Sozialberichter-
stattung, Frankfurt 1977, for a characterization of the most important research unit in this 
field in Germany, SPES: Zapf, Wolfgang (ed.), Soziale Indikatoren, 3 vols., Frankfurt 
1974-1975. This field is internationalizing fast, as can be derived from international data 
collections such as EUROSTAT: Social Indicators for the European Community, Luxem-
burg 1977; and there is also now an international newssheet: Social Indicators Newsletter, 
Social Science Research Council, New York. While much of this work is pure induction, 
there are attempts to develop a rationale as in Fox, Karl A., Social Indicators and Social 
Theory, New York 1974; OECD, Measuring Social Well-Being, Paris 1976. Decisive for 
the expansion of basic research using these resources will be the development of an appro-
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other proper ties presumably do: it is great to be rich but it satisfies a lot less than 
expected. Many of the facts and figures are suspected to be less informative than we 
thought at a time when each new fact or figure possessed a novelty value. 
To give one example of considerable personal importance. During the fifties it 
was empirically demonstrated again and again that one large difference between 
mass opinion in Europe and in the United States was what political scientists con-
ceptualized as “system trust”. Europeans were shown to be highly sceptical about 
their politicians, their political parties, and sometimes also of all of the political sys-
tem. In contrast, respondents in the United States expressed an unshakable respect 
for the office of the president and the institution of the two-party-system, even 
when they detested a particular president or found their two political parties at a 
given time to be in terrible shape. Just as they were reputedly cynical about morals, 
these Europeans were called political cynics, and American political scientists con-
cluded that this was not a condition in which a meaningful democracy could florish. 
Now that we count the year five post-Watergate the trust of Americans in their po-
litical institutions is below that which opinion researchers now report for European 
countries27. What did we measure some thirty years ago: Was it really an aspect of a 
distinct political structure, or merely a mood? And do changes in mood matter very 
much in the operation of a political system?28 
In looking back at over thirty years of data collection we can observe both high 
stability of differences between countries and groups within a country for some sub-
ject matter, and great changes up to ficklishness of figures in other areas. In the 
field of leisure we have witnessed a high instability of behavior, and this is cur-
rently especially true in research on tourism29. Research on sexual matters has 
shown a tremendous instability in beliefs and opinions, and far more stability than 
instability in behavior. Currently, there is in Germany a debate whether we witness 
a major change in values amongst youth — the school of “post industrialism” be-
lieves that this is so —, and whether the traditional work ethic is falling apart; it is 
by no means clear what the figures really do indicate. Where do we measure a 
structural property, where do we record a mere transitional state? Sociologists are 
becoming — albeit a bit too slow — more careful in interpreting numbers. 
Empiricism was quite successful in providing a basis for micro sociology. Macro 
sociology, however, did not progress in the way it was hoped. In Germany it was 
especially a group of sociologists sometimes called by others the “Cologne School” 
that had advocated cross-level analysis and corresponding data collection as the 
methodology appropriate for macro sociology30. However, the pay-off of this theo-
                                                                                                                                
priate infrastructure of data services, as reported by Rokkan, Stein, Data Services in West-
ern Europe — Reflections on Variation in the Conditions of Academic Institution-Building, 
in: American Behavioral Scientist, 19 (1976), pp. 443-454. 
27  Cf. Huntington, Samuel, et al., The Crisis of Western Democracy, New York 1976. 
28  Critical of the literature on the loss of governability is Scheuch, Erwin K., Wird die 
Bundesrepublik unregierbar?, AGV Metall, Köln 1976. 
29  See Scheuch, Erwin K., and Scherhorn, Gerhard, Soziologie der Freizeit und des Konsums, 
in: König, René (ed.), Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung, Vol. 11, Stuttgart 1977. 
30  An overview is given in H. J. Hummel, an adherent of the “Cologne School”, Probleme der 
Mehrebenen Analyse, Stuttgart 1972. A very optimistic expectation was formulated during 
the sixteenth German “Soziologentag” in Frankfurt 1968 by Scheuch, Erwin K., Meth-
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retically sound notion has been far less than hoped for31. Whether this is due to the 
empirical research, or the conceptualization of it, or the far greater complexity of an 
empirically founded macro sociology is an open question. 
Research tools are proliferating at a very rapid rate. Techniques that were known 
for a long time but little used, such as complicated sampling techniques for sub-
groups of large populations, or techniques of content analysis — are now being ac-
tually used. The machinery of large scale electronic data processing is important in 
turning esoteric knowledge into practical procedures. There are many original ideas 
in developing so-called unobtrusive techniques i. e. highly inferential measures in-
dependent of verbal statements32. And in general, there is a greater willingness to 
combine measurements from several sources: Sociologists may become as critical 
of their data as historians reputedly are of their sources. On the other hand with the 
explosive growth of analysis opportunities there has been a tendency to overanalyze 
some data. The debate about weak versus strong measurement indicates that there 
has been an unthinking preference for the most powerful statistical techniques re-
gardless of the level of measurement and the reliability of a figure33. The lauer is a 
tendency that quantitative historians should better watch. 
There is now some better understanding of what John Stuart Mill meant when he 
argued that the social sciences were “observational”, and why Emile Durkheim was 
anti-experimental. One does not have to reject the experiment as a tool of research 
in order to sympathize with the notions about the character of social systems that 
lead to the anti-experimentalism of Mills and Durkheim. Many social phenomena 
have meaning depending on contexts, are interconnected and multifunctional. Even 
elementary activities such as eating or sexual intercourse carry several meanings! 
Social processes are both over- and underdetermined. Relating single variables to 
each other does usually not do justice to the structure of social phenomena, and 
with the realization of this condition, analysis techniques are being developed that 
are more appropriate to the interconnectedness and multidimensionality of social 
                                                                                                                                
odische Probleme gesamtgesellschaftlicher Analysen, in: Adorno, Theodor W. (ed.), Spät-
kapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft?, Stuttgart 1969, pp. 153-182. 
31  Massive secondary analysis of data on voting behavior by Franz U. Pappi found in the end 
that including contextual variables added very little to the explanatory power of the routine 
individual variables; cf. Pappi, Franz Urban, Sozialstruktur und politische Konflikte in der 
Bundesrepublik. Individual- und Kontextanalysen der Wahlenentscheidung, Köln, Univ., 
Habil.-Schrift, 1977. 
32  The “classical” source on unobtrusive techniques is Webb, Eugene, et al., Unobtrusive 
Measures, Chicago 1966. A prerequisite for the large scale use of quantitative content 
analysis is their combination with sampling techniques; see Kops, Manfred, Auswahlver-
fahren in der Inhaltsanalyse, Meisenheim a. G. 1977. Important contributions to methodol-
ogy that are especially useful for quantifying and analyzing historical material are Stein-
hausen, Detlef, and Langer, Klaus, Clusteranalyse, Berlin 1977, and Sodeur, Wolfgang, 
Empirische Verfahren zur Klassifikation, Stuttgart 1974. An overview of research tech-
niques that includes advanced methods relevant to quantitative history yet accessible to the 
non-specialist in methodology is van Koolwijk, Jürgen, and Wieken-Mayser, Maria (eds.), 
Techniken der empirischen Sozialforschung, vols. 2-7, München 1974-1977. 
33  For the debate on the level of measurement appropriate to the data see Scheuch, Erwin K., 
Forschungstechniken als Teil der Soziologie heute, in: Lepsius, Zwischenbilanz, especially 
pp. 94 passim. Compare also Acock, Man C., and Martin, David, The Undermeasurement 
Controversy, in: Sociology and Social Research, 58 (1974), pp. 427 passim. 
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phenomena. Path analysis, causal analysis and LISREL are examples for this 
trend34. 
It is doubtful that the limits in explanation which empirical sociologists now 
sometimes encounter can be overcome solely by further analysis techniques, and a 
more systematic combination of data. For many problems longer periods of obser-
vation are required, and an extension of conditions under which behavior is ob-
served. Quantitative history can provide this extension of the data base for sociol-
ogy — not so much in quantity but more importantly in quality. In turn, the 
response of sociology to the multicollineality of relations between variables, the 
reaction to the multidimensionality of social phenomena, means that today sociolo-
gists can offer much more adequate techniques of data handling than would have 
been possible only ten years ago. 
The recent meeting of historians with sociologists, in Germany connected with 
such names as Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Hans Mommsen, has not necessarily been 
the most helpful experience35. These historians hoped to borrow concepts and gen-
eralizations from sociology to regain a larger scope for the discipline of history that 
appeared to be bogged down into historiographic details. This was an inopportune 
time to do so, leaving aside the question whether there was ever an opportune time 
for this. 
It was a time when many of us realized that our concepts were more time-
andspace-bound than we had so far suspected. For some sociologists it was also a 
time for a “paradigm change” — away from systems analysis with its harmonistic 
view of biology. We now understand biology in a very different way, namely as the 
discipline of imperfectly constructed beings, as of organisms that side-by-side are 
characterized by surplusses and deficiencies. Real social systems are evidently im-
perfectly integrated, and by now it is no longer very easy to say what the boundary 
of the systems is that we are analyzing. We cannot simply use national boundaries 
as being also system boundaries, as the nation state is coming apart as the highest 
level of integration. Devolution within nation states and international connectedness 
make the nation state level just one of several levels that indicated system bounda-
ries. This is an intellectually richer and more flexible sociology, but it is certainly 
not one from which one could easily borrow ready concepts and generalizations. 
V. Quantitative Analysis of Historical Material as an Extension 
of Comparativism 
A more fruitful orientation in seeking a cooperation between sociology and history 
is cooperation in exploiting a new data base. Time budget research offers an exam-
                                                             
34  Cf. Ziegler, Rolf, Theorie und Modell, München 1972; also Blalock, Hubert M., Causal 
Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, Chapel Hill 1964; also Weede, Erich, Hypothe-
sen, Gleichungen und Daten, Kronberg Ts. 1977. 
35  As a source for this approach that could be called the sociologization of history instead of 
the shared use of historical data, consult Wehler, Geschichte und Soziologie. By now there 
are side-by-side several forms of cooperation between sociology and history, as is evident 
from the range of contributions in Ludz, Peter Christian (ed.), Soziologie und Sozial-
geschichte, Special issue No. 16, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 
(1972) — especially the introduction by the editor. 
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ple for the character of such a research. The use of time is a social indicator lending 
itself to several interpretations, an indicator that can be put to many uses36. In some 
of the socialist countries, time budget data are employed for such engineering pur-
poses as the calculation of waste times, while the very same data are used by West-
ern social scientists to identify the networks of daily intercourse. Many of the data 
of quantitative history have the same indeterminate character as time budgets have. 
Viewed methodologically, most analyses of quantitative history have the character 
rather of secondary analysis than of primary analysis37. This may often cause prob-
lems in interpretation, but it does also facilitate cooperation between scholars from 
different disciplines and with different approaches: They do not need to agree on 
problem formulations, or concepts. Thus, in looking at quantitative history as an 
opportunity for secondary analyses of vast quantities of data about previously inac-
cessible topics and subjects, the pitfalls of the above mentioned approach — the 
Wehler-Mommsen problem — is avoided. 
It is dangerous when sociologists by themselves quantify and analyze historical 
data, as they usually lack the familiarity with the contexts of these data; and it is no 
less hazardous if historians feel confident to order high powered statistics from the 
now easy-to-use packages. But cooperation between sociologists and historians 
properly goes beyond such a symbiosis in research technology. Historians rightfully 
expect that quantitative history will give new impetus to history as a generalizing 
discipline, and sociologists hope for a vast extension of their empirical base. In this 
latter sense the use of historical data is a form of comparativism, is observation un-
der varying conditions in the sense that John Stuart Mills argued for “observational” 
social sciences. This form of comparativism complements and extends significantly 
what currently is being done in comparative social research. 
One of the important resources for sociological comparativism has always been 
— earlier more so than during the last decades — ethnology, and here a develop-
ment analogous to that now in quantitative history occured much earlier. A group of 
ethnologists around John Peter Murdock from Yale translated the ethnographic re-
ports of their time into a common scheme38. This meant among other things that 
checklists had to be developed for institutions and fields of behavior as a prerequi-
site for the coding of ethnographic descriptions. Methodologically, this implied the 
translation of descriptive accounts into configurations of variables. Only through 
this “translation” becomes it possible to develop a quantitative ethnology on a 
world scale as though the descriptive accounts had been questionnaires about cul-
tures: Frequencies are identified, correlations are computed, factor analyses are 
meant to show hidden communalities. By now the “Human Relations Area File” 
(HRAF) is in part machine readable, and available in several countries. While this 
increases its accessibility, and makes comparative ethnography something every 
                                                             
36  Cf. Szalai, The Use of Time. 
37  “Secondary” does not imply “second class” but denotes a use of data different from the 
intentions with which the data were collected. The classical source on the methodological 
issues in secondary analysis is Hyman, Herbert, Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys — 
Principles, Procedures, and Potentialities, New York 1972. 
38  Cf. Murdock, George Peter, Social Structure, New York 1949; also World Ethnographic 
Sample, in: Moore, F. W. (ed.), Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology, New Haven 
1961. 
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graduate Student can practice, the decisive step was not the machinery but the 
“translation” of the narratives. The organization of data sets from projects in quanti-
tative history could do the same for historical data39. 
It would be of considerable greater consequence. The Human Relations Area 
File has data from more than 500 cultures, and while there are greater variations 
between, the hundreds of simpler cultures, they remain simple cultures that are of 
limited relevance for the understanding of a complex modern society. Even though 
the volume of quantitative history has been limited, at least as compared to quanti-
tative ethnology, its impact for social science has been far greater40. The conditions 
and the impact of social differentation can only be studied by looking at other com-
plex civilizations. It is indeed quite necessary to use historical complex civilizations 
for purposes of comparison in order to avoid a tendency in sociology to argue post 
hoc propter hoc. Bureaucracies, corporate associations, formalization of procedures 
are part of our daily live — but does that make them distinctive features of indus-
trial societies? There is no other way to establish what is unique about industrial 
civilizations, and what is a feature of many complex societies, than to engage in 
historical comparisons. In this perspective the quantitative analysis of conditions 
during the Roman Empire at the time of the principat may contribute more to our 
understanding of contemporary industrial societies than yet another survey. 
An example may help. In working on the sociology of vacations and tourism it is 
usual to assume that long-distance travel, weekend excursions, and the desertion of 
cities during the holiday season are phenomena unique to the very different indus-
trial societies41. However, weekend traffic problems were part of life in the richer 
Greek cities, holidy desertion of cities was common amongst the bourgeoisie of 
                                                             
39  A survey in Germany showed that in 1977 there were more than two hundred machine 
readable data sets with quantified historical information; compare Bick, Wolfgang, et al., 
Quantitative historische Forschung 1977, Stuttgart 1977. (= Historisch Sozialwissenschaft-
liche Forschungen, Vol. 1). See also in the same series which is issued in cooperation with 
the International Association for Historical Social Research, QUANTUM: Best, Heinrich, 
und Mann, Reinhard (eds.), Quantitative Methoden in der historisch-sozialwissenschaft-
lichen Forschung, Stuttgart 1977, and Müller, Die Analyse prozeß-produzierter Daten. 
40  The development has gone furthest in the United States, and the best source to follow is the 
Journal Historical Methods Newsletter, between 1968 and 1977 ten volumes. An example is 
Volume 9, Nos. 2 and 3 on one of the massive cases of quantitative history, the Philadel-
phia Social History Project. There is a very long tradition of a social science orientation 
with attention to quantitative data in France, the school of the Annales; cf. Iggers, Georg, 
Die ‘Annales’ und ihre Kritiker, in: Historische Zeitschrift, 219 (1974), pp. 579-608. The 
most direct impact on sociologists in English and German speaking countries can be attrib-
uted to the works of the brothers Tilly; Tilly, Charles, et al., The Rebellious Century 1880-
1930, Cambridge/ Mass. 1975; Shorter, Edward, and Tilly, Charles, Strikes in France 1830-
1968, Cambridge/ England 1974; Tilly, Charles, The Vendee, Cambridge/ Mass. 1964; 
Tilly, Richard, Popular Disorders in Nineteenth Century Germany, in: Journal of Social 
History, 4 (1970). In Europe, Stein Rokkan in his many publications on nation-building has 
done more than any other individual scholar to further quantification of historical material 
for sociological analyses. An overview of the breadth of this development can be found in 
Flora, Peter, Quantitative Historical Sociology, in: Current Sociology, 23, No. 2 (1975). 
41 This is maintained e.g. in Scheuch, Erwin K., and Meyersohn, Rolf (eds.), Soziologie der 
Freizeit, Köln 1972, pp. 304-317. Some years later this opinion is revised in Scheuch and 
Scherhorn, Soziologie der Freizeit und des Konsums, pp. 115-147. 
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classical Rome, and long distance travel institutionalized in several high civiliza-
tions such as Sumer, Persia, and Moghul India42. Several high civilizations even 
developed some infrastructure for travel, such as the road networks of ancient 
China or Persia or Rome, complete with a system of accomodations. However, at 
least one phenomenon appears to be unique to a modern civilization, namely the 
regular travel for pleasure only, while other travel such as the “Bildungsreise” have 
been developed in other high civilizations. 
Economic historians now inform us that production for markets is nothing 
unique to our industrial civilization43 nor is occupational specialization nor are elec-
tion campaigns44. However, the differentiating out of economic activities appears to 
be a feature of our industrial societies, are a characteristic that to someone from a 
non-Western society gives our civilization a commercial flavor. In most cultures 
economic matters are subservient to political considerations, and political power is 
deemed a central goal and not economic well being. And in all other cultures eco-
nomic relations between people who know each other are subservient to require-
ments and considerations of the social fabric45. Beyond economics, it may be possi-
ble that the generally distinguishing character of Western industrial societies is the 
sectorial rationality, the differentiating out of sector after sector from diffuse and 
multifunctional roles46. 
However, such a statement may not last long in view of the many surprising 
findings of the history of our early industrial periods. Now we learn that not even 
early capitalism lived up to its reputation of mindless exploitation of helpless prole-
tarians. Undoubtedly this occurred in the large industrial agglomerations, but in 
production and in living conditions on a smaller scale the employers cared not only 
for profit but also for their local reputation as human beings47. In addition to the 
comparison with other high civilization, the quantification of European data both of 
the Tate medieval period and of early industrialization are likely to be important 
contributions to our understanding of the distinguishing features of modern indus-
trial societies. 
This does not mean to just wait for the conclusions of historians, this requires 
data to be handled in ways that are usual in sociology, and for problem formulations 
that are sociological. This should be evident for what we believe to be characteristic 
for modern civilizations of the Western variety, namely the prevalence of sectorial 
rationality. It was already mentioned that in other civilizations our economic ration-
ality is practiced in exchanges with outsiders, and this behavior is considered un-
                                                             
42  Many details can be found in Casson, Lionel, Reisen in der alten Welt, London 1974. 
43  For Germany, urban history is the chief corrective for the previous inclination to mistake 
ideals for reality. See Kellenbenz, Hermann (ed.), Zwei Jahrtausende Kölner Wirtschaft, 2 
vols., Köln 1975. 
44  Cf. Etienne, Robert, La vie quotidienne à Pompéi, Book no. 2, Chapter 2, Paris 1966. 
45  This is a central theme in the research of Raymond Firth about the tribal cultures in the 
South Pacific, Elements of Social Organization, London 1951. 
46  This is the central notion in Scheuch, Erwin, K., The Relationship of Government and Busi-
ness to the Individual in Democratic and Totalitarian Systems, in: International Conference 
on the Unity of Science, Vol. 4, International Cultural Foundation, New York 1978. 
47  See Stearns, Peter N., Die Herausbildung einer sozialen Gesinnung im Frühindustrialismus 
— ein Vergleich der Auffassungen französischer, britischer und deutscher Unternehmer, in: 
Ludz, Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte, pp. 320-342. 
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friendly. However, even with Western industrial societies there are limits to the ex-
tension of a specific economic rationality: We do not accept economic rationality 
between spouses, and between parents and children. For us, a really functioning 
family is based on communist sentiments, namely to each according to his needs 
and from each according to his abilities. In some areas such as sports, there is both 
sectorial rationality and diffuse standards, distinguishing the professional with a 
specific sectorial rationality from the amateur for whom sports has a diffuse mean-
ing. Good research with the intention to specify sectorial rationalities requires the 
manipulation of historical material such as diaries or personal letters, looking for 
indications of value conflicts and for justifications of behavior. There is little hope 
that a historian would systematically look for indications of such aspects of behav-
ior that are not part of the problem understanding of his discipline or of people 
themselves. In this sense there are many problems where sociologists cannot be 
consumers of conclusions from quantitative history but have to reexaminate quanti-
fied historical material. 
VI. The Importance of Descriptive Knowledge 
However, quantitative history is of tremendous importance to sociologists in so far 
as it is an extension and more often a correction of social history. Students are still 
being tested by asking them to explain the loi de contraction by Emile Durkheim, 
and yet quantitative historical research shows that in all likelihood this loi de con-
traction is simply in error, is repeating what were the erroneous perceptions of elo-
quent contemporaries48. Provided we would hand on to our successors as the condi-
tion of public safety what our newspapers write, this would amount to a massive 
handing-on of misinformation; provided we were to hand on what magazines write 
about family life today, our successors would be better of without that information. 
However, many, many of the statements about daily life in the past are based on 
reports that are no more reliable than newspaper reports or the impression of con-
temporary intellectual gurus about our own industrial societies. Even if the guru or 
newspaper were correct about a condition or a change, they would be incompetent 
to characterize the diversity existing at this time and earning our societies the label 
“pluralistic systems”. Now that some preliterate cultures have been studied by more 
than one ethnologists we understand that even those relatively simple cultures have 
diversity, and that past ethnography reduced that diversity to an ideal type. It is rea-
sonable that in historical societies there was no less diversity, that differences be-
tween actual behavior and official norms were common-place, and that an informal 
system paralleled official structure much as this is the case for our societies. Most 
                                                             
48  This is the conclusion of a number of quantitative studies in urban history, such as Hub-
bard, William H., Der Wachstumsprozeß in den österreichischen Gross-Städten 1868-1910, 
in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Special issue 16, pp. 386-418, 
and Forschungen zu städtischer Haushaltsstruktur am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts — Das 
GRAZHAUS-Projekt, in: Conze, Werner (ed.), Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit 
Europas, Stuttgart 1977, pp. 283-291. Compare also Thernstrom, St., The Other Bostonians, 
Cambridge/ Mass. 1976; Katz, M. B., The People of Hamilton, Canada West, Cambridge/ 
Mass. 1975. 
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social history is simply hopeless in these respects, and the only hope is the system-
atic analysis of large quantities of evidences of daily life in the past. 
Was the exploitation of colonies a major cause for the economic development of 
France, or Germany? Was the French revolution caused by an intolerable pauperi-
zation of ordinary people? Was the middle of the 19th century in Germany a time 
when in economic controversies capitalists stood against labor? By now we know 
through quantitative history that the answer to all three questions is “no”49 — and 
that is by no means unimportant for sociology. It will become even more evident to 
which degree we have based sociological statements on a social history that is be-
coming defunct. 
For this author descriptive knowledge about the economy of the Roman Empire 
as it was furthered especially by historians in Oxford and in Princeton, became of 
great importance. My understanding of Rome was very much colored by the Ger-
man historical tradition which concentrates on the turmoil period of the Roman Re-
public, and in the tradition of Theodor Mommsen understands this period as the 
corruption of republican ideals — which I now see as a perspective that is very 
much beside the point. By way of contrast British economic history has always em-
phasized the empire during its successful time — which after all is several hundred 
years. During this time the economic order was a variant, from a partial market 
economy to the centralized state socialism of Diocletian. During the whole time of 
the Roman Empire, the governments were unable to cure inflation and to establish a 
sound currency for any extended period — which, by the way, the Chinese Empire 
failed to do as well. Whether detailed regulations or market mechanisms: Nothing 
really worked. 
And yet the Roman Empire failed to decay, while undoubtedly our systems 
would be mortally threatened if there would be inflation on the Roman scale over 
many decades. Being raised on Parsons I had believed that when interchanges are 
seriously upset there will be countervailing processes until the disturbances are cor-
rected; the Roman Empire demonstrates that social systems can live with unsolved 
problems on a massive scale — provided there are redeeming features. In the case 
of the Roman Empire its performance as a political and legal order was obviously 
so impressive in comparison to other contemporary systems that the “Roman Way 
of Life” was as successful an export article as the American Way of Life was after 
World War II. 
Perhaps this is a general feature of highly differentiated societies: that they have 
“central problems” but are at the same time able to live with them via redeeming 
features. More descriptive knowledge would help in translating this still very vague 
notion into a researchable question. However vague this notion, the descriptive ma-
terial was already sufficient to correct the conventional wisdom in American soci-
ology. Perhaps there will be reports based on quantitiative history about other ad-
vanced civilizations that lasted hundreds of years without solving some central 
problem; perhaps these reports will inform us what the character of countervailing 
forces was. 
                                                             
49  For question no. 1 see Hochheimer, Albert, Abschied von den Kolonien, Zürich 1972; for 
question no. 2 compare Tilly, Charles, Ventile; for question no. 3 see Best, Heinrich, Inter-
essenpolitik und nationale Integration 1848/49 — Handelspolitische Konflikte im frühin-
dustriellen Deutschland, Göttingen 1980. 
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It is especially quantitative history as the rewriting of conventional historiogra-
phy, and as the extension of knowledge about forgotten eras that will have an im-
portant impact on sociology. One last example: We can expect important insights 
into the change of systems when the fifth century in Western Europe is being ana-
lyzed. The notion of a Roman Empire being overrun by screaming Barbarian hords 
bent an destruction is stark nonsense; Roman power did not collapse or was broken 
— it simply seeped away50. It is a story of desintegration and not of forceful de-
struction. 
This is an exciting time both for historians and for social scientists. There is 
more than one way in which the discipline will benefit from the renewed encounter. 
Programmatic debates will have little utility in starting the development. Much the 
best way to aid this development is simply more empirical work. 
                                                             
50  Sterzl, Anton, Der Untergang Roms an Rhein und Mosel, Köln 1978; also Ternes, Charles-
Marie, La vie quotidienne en Rhénanie Romaine (Ier-IVieme siècle), Paris 1972. 
